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TheGood Samaritan and the Hygienic Cook:
a cautionary tale about linguistic data
Abstract: When developing formal theories of the meaning of language, it is appropri-
ate to consider how apparent paradoxes and conundrums of language are best resolved.
But if we base our analysis on a small sample of data then we may fail to take into ac-
count the influence of other aspects of meaning on our intuitions. Here we consider the
so-called Good Samaritan Paradox (Prior, 1958), where we wish to avoid any implica-
tion that there is an obligation to rob someone from “You must help a robbed man”. We
argue that before settling on a formal analysis of such sentences, we should consider ex-
amples of the same form, but with intuitively different entailments—such as “You must
use a clean knife”—and also actively seek other examples that exhibit similar contrasts
in meaning, even if they do not exemplify the phenomena that is under investigation.
This can refine our intuitions and help us to attribute aspects of interpretation to the
various facets of meaning.
1 Introduction
Deontic reasoning is concerned with sentences involving obligations and
permissions (“Ought”, “Can”, etc.). The objectives include: identifying
the nature of the inferences that should be supported which involve obli-
gations and permissions; selecting appropriate formal machinery for formal-
ising such entailments; and deciding how natural language obligations and
permissions should be “translated” into such a formal system. Of course, we
might question whether obligations and permissions lend themselves to such
a formal analysis. But the issue we are concerned with is the problem of
deciding which aspects of linguistic data, and any semantic theory dealing
with that data, are genuinely and essentially deontic in nature, as opposed to
falling within the remit of some other aspect of interpretation.
The concerns described in this paper arose in the context of a general re-
search programme to find alternatives to possible worlds interpretations of
2various semantic phenomena (Fox, 2009). In this case, the original objec-
tive was to consider whether it is possible to formulate a theory of deontic
reasoning that addresses problems in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) (von
Wright, 1951; McNamara, 2006a,b) and which does not make explicit appeal
to a possible-worlds interpretation. But in seeking to find a proof-theoretic
account of deontic reasoning it turned out that there are certain difficulties
when it comes to interpreting the data, in particular the question of deciding
which aspects of the behaviour of deontic examples is genuinely deontic in
nature.
One assumption that we make here is that a formal analysis of obligations
should seek to account for obligations as expressed using natural language.
In particular, we do not assume that the primary objective is to formalise
some pure, abstract notion of obligations, and then attribute any difficulties
to the imperfect nature of natural language.
2 The Good Samaritan
One problematic example for some accounts of deontic reasoning is due to
Prior (1958). It seems reasonable to say the following.
“It is obligatory to help a man who has been robbed.”
“It is obligatory to help a robbed man.”
“It is obligatory that Arthur help Robert, who has been robbed by
Benjamin.”
These can also be given a conditional formulation.1
“If a man has been robbed, it is obligatory to help him.”
“If Roberti has been robbed by Benjamin, is obligatory that Arthur
help himi.”
For much of this paper, we will focus on the non-conditional forms that use
adjectives and relative clauses. These can be restated in more every-day
1In connection with what we might call the “conjunctive” and the “conditional” vari-
ants of his example, it might be worth observing that some accounts of the semantics of
natural language which use constructive type theory treat conditionals and conjunction
in a very similar fashion (Ranta, 1994).
3language as follows.
“You should help a man who has been robbed.”
“You should help a robbed man.”
There are at least two problems when it come to providing a formal anal-
ysis of these examples. First, the obligation may be expressed with singular
indefinites (i.e. “. . . help a robbed man”), but presumably it is intended to
express, or impose, some universal obligation (i.e. “. . . help every robbed
man”). It could be argued that this is merely a particular example of the
more general problem of analysing generic expressions (Carlson & Pelletier,
1995). It is important to be aware of this issue, but we are not seeking to
provide a comprehensive solution to this problem here. Even so, it does
exemplify the point we are making that our intuitions about a given phenom-
ena may implicitly be coloured by other aspects of meaning. The second
problem we will identify is of more central concern for deontic reasoning.
At this juncture it is worth giving some salient details of Standard Deontic
Logic (SDL), which can be considered to be a paradigm treatment of obli-
gations and permissions (McNamara, 2006a,b). In SDL, the operator O is
applied to a proposition p to indicate that there is an obligation for p to be
the case, or be “brought about”.2
SDL includes the following rule
If ` (p → q) then ` (Op → Oq)
where “→” is used to represent material implication and “` p” means that p
is a theorem. SDL also supports the classical tautologies, including
` ((p ∧ q) → p)
` ((p ∧ q) → q)
where “∧” represents conjunction. Combining these yields the following.
` (O(p ∧ q) → Oq)
` (O(p ∧ q) → Op)
2We may question whether SDL is right to take the content p of an obligation O(p)
to be a regular proposition—a point raised by Castañeda (1981) and others—but such
concerns will be put aside for the moment.
4So in SDL, obligation distributes across conjunction: if we are told that
O(p ∧ q), we can infer Op and Oq. Now let us return to one of the Good
Samaritan examples and see what happens when we try to analyse it within
SDL.
If we assume that “help” can be represented as a predicate, and “robbed”
is an intersective adjective, also represented by a predicate, then to a first
approximation “help a robbed man” appears to involve an expression of the
form
. . . help′(x) ∧ man′(x) ∧ robbed′(x) . . .
This suggests that the formalisation of an obligation to help a robbed man
should include something of the form
O(help′(x) ∧ man′(x) ∧ robbed′(x))
or more simply
O(h ∧ m ∧ r)
If it is implicitly assumed that m is vacuously fulfilled, then this can be sim-
plified to
O(h ∧ r)
But assuming this is broadly an appropriate interpretation (putting aside var-
ious details), then in SDL, we can then infer
O(r)
That is, there is an obligation to rob, which may be regarded as an undesir-
able conclusion.
Anyone versed in the complexities of the compositional analysis of natu-
ral language would feel compelled to point out that this simple, conjunctive
interpretation ignores many issues, including the proper analysis of quan-
tifiers, determiners, modifier expressions, relative clauses and conditionals.
For this reason, we may argue that such a naïve interpretation is inappro-
priate and potentially misleading. It is conceivable that a more principled
compositional analysis of the example might lead us to consider the issue
5differently. As with the question of generic interpretations of obligations,
this is an area where we need to look at broader issues in the interpretation
of language to identify the true nature of any problem with a particular ex-
ample. For the purpose of further discussion, we shall assume that the broad
thrust of the problem remains. Regardless of our position on how best to pro-
vide a systematic translation of the examples into a formal language, there
is no doubt that the problem of inappropriate distributive inferences in SDL
and other deontic frameworks is considered a very real one in the literature.
Proposals to address this example include: having different kinds of obli-
gations (Åqvist, 1967); using a conditional analysis (van Fraassen, 1972);
exploiting distinctions in the categories of semantic expressions (Castañeda,
1981); or considering agency (Nowell-Smith & Lemmon, 1960). Other pro-
posals that are relevant include denying that obligations distribute (Jackson,
1985; Jones & Pörn, 1985); and the use defeasible inference (Bonevac, 1998;
Makinson & van der Torre, 2003). We will outline these in turn.
One approach is to have multiple levels of obligation, as in the logic DL2
(Åqvist, 1967). In the case of the Good Samaritan, then on this account
there is a “primary” obligation not to rob: O1(¬ r), where “¬” represents
negation. The statement of interest is a “reparational” obligation to help
someone who has been robbed: O2(r∧h). In DL2, any reparational obligation
will be vacuous when its propositional content describes a state-of-affairs
that conflicts with a primary obligation. This means that even though we
may derive O2(r) from O2(r∧h), the apparent obligation to rob—and indeed
the entire reparational obligation—is rendered void by the existence of the
primary obligation O1(¬ r).
There are a number of questions about this approach, including how we
are to determine the levels of various potentially conflicting obligations in
the general case. According to Åqvist, the approach needs to be gener-
alised to arbitrary levels of obligation, giving a logic DLω. We may question
whether there are principled methods for assigning obligations to different
levels, and guaranteeing that there are no conflicting obligations at the same
level. While it could be argued that a coherent system of rules should address
potential conflicts and indicate the desired priorities, it is not so clear how
6this can be achieved with more everyday obligations, or obligations that are
imposed by different authorities. To say that all conflicts are to be resolved
by imposing an ordering could be seen to be only a partial solution if we do
not know how such an ordering is to be determined.3
van Fraassen (1972) concentrates on the analysis of the relative clause
present in some of the problematic examples. He assumes we need to iden-
tify an individual i with “the man who has been robbed” (call this fact V).
We cannot derive that “a man has been robbed” (r) without this identity fact
V . Rather than (h ∧ r), from which we can infer r, we have (h ∧ V) from
which we can infer r. In particular, V is not within the scope of the obliga-
tion. van Fraassen offers a conditional re-interpretation using the principle
that if ` (h∧V) → r, then ` O(h/V) → O((h∧ r)/V), where O(h/V) denotes
an obligation for h to be the case in the event that V is the case. In essence,
the obligation is to help a man (and the man has been robbed) on condition
that the man is a man who has been robbed.
Putting the conditional framework to one side, this account hinges on a
substitution fact. If substitutions are not required in the analysis of the Good
Samaritan, then this fails to block the problematic inference. Something that
undermines this analysis is that most contemporary accounts of the syntax-
semantics interface do not rely on substitution facts being expressed in the
logic.4
Castañeda (1981) notes there is often a grammatical distinction between
propositional and “practives” expressions. In the current example, it appears
to be possible to identify a grammatical distinction between a propositional
character in “robbed” that is distinct from a practive character of “[to] help”.
Castañeda uses this distinction to motivate the argument that normally only
practive expressions are subject to the modal force of an obligation. Using
subscripts prop and pract to distinguish between propositional and practive
3In its model-theoretic interpretation, the approach also raises questions about ideal
worlds and extensions, in common with many possible worlds accounts, but we will not
consider these issues here.
4Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) may provide a counter-example to this
norm; in DRT nominal references are resolved using explicit identity statements in the
representation (Kamp, 1981).
7content, respectively, then on this accountO(rprop∧hpract) is really equivalent
to r∧O(h). Thus there is no obligation to rob, as that has propositional rather
than practive content.
Relevant to this account is an observation by (Åqvist, 1967) that highlights
a problem with the analysis that robbing is outside the scope of obligation.
Intuitively, it is consistent to say “It ought to be that if Smith refrains from
robbing Jones then the Samaritan does not help Jones”. But now there are
circumstances whereO(h) andO(¬ h) can be derived (which is not permitted
in SDL). Also, the linguistic evidence is not entirely clear-cut (at least in
English). The sentence
“It ought to be the case that Peter sells his cat.”
expresses an obligation, but even if it can be given a different analysis, the
content of the obligation appears syntactically indistinguishable from the
propositional sentence “Peter sells his cat.”. If we use the modal context
to force some non-propositional reading of this clause, then the question
arises as to what criteria are to be used to discriminate between practive and
propositional clauses in the semantics.5
An alternative to SDL is to treat obligations as what you need to do to
escape a sanction (S ) (Prior, 1958). On this account, Op corresponds to
¬ p → S . That is, a failure to fulfil the obligation leads to the sanction.
The Good Samaritan (as originally expressed) is that if the obligation to
help is fulfilled, then the sanction S must apply, as someone must have been
robbed. It is in the context of this account that this problem was first iden-
tified. Nowell-Smith & Lemmon (1960) seek to avoid this problem by ex-
tending Prior’s approach so the sanction is indexed by the person who is
sanctioned. This enables them to make clear that the Samaritan is not sub-
ject to the sanction of the robber. For x to help y in the event y is robbed by
5In support of Castañeda (1981) it is worth noting that some simple present tense
sentences such as “You sell your cat” can sound rather odd unless they are intended to
be part of either an hypothetical discourse (a present subjunctive), or something border-
ing on an imperative. A diagnostic as to whether the subjunctive or indicative form is
preferred would be the relative acceptability of “be” (subjunctive) and “is” (indicative)
in “It ought to be the case that Peter be/is happy”. In this case, there may also be an opta-
tive reading that expresses a desire rather than an obligation. As with other phenomena,
grammatical distinctions are not always a reliable guide to semantic distinctions.
8z avoids a sanction for x, but implies there is a sanction for z.
Nowell-Smith & Lemmon themselves identify a potential philosophical
objection to this approach, namely that the reduction of obligation to the
propositional realm may be a form of “naturalistic fallacy”. We will not go
into this here, but merely note that there is another weakness in the account,
namely that use of agency by itself is insufficiently fine-grained to account
for the data on other forms of reparational obligation (Fox, 2009). This can
be seen in the following example, where it is explicit that the agent of the
obligations concerning stealing and reparation are the same.
“You ought not steal.”
“If you steal, you ought to make amends.”
A catch-all solution to the problem of inferring inappropriate obligations
is to deny that obligations distribute down to the components of a sentence
(Jackson, 1985; Jones & Pörn, 1985). To be specific, there is no general
inference from O(r ∧ h) to O(r) and O(h). The denial of distribution avoids
inferring that there is an obligation to rob.
One problem with such a solution is that it blocks further analysis of what
is actually required by the obligation. It could be argued that potentially
useful inferences are blocked along with the problematic ones. Although it
may be the case that obligation does not generally distribute across conjunc-
tion, it is still legitimate to consider the necessary and sufficient conditions
for fulfilling complex obligations, rather than treating them as universally
irreducible.
As an alternative to the complete rejection of distributive inferences, we
might take there to be a general assumption that obligations do distribute
across logical operators such as conjunction, but that such inferences are
defeasible (Bonevac, 1998; Makinson & van der Torre, 2003). On such an
account, we can normally infer that we are obliged to “rob” and “help”, but
other contextual information may override such inferences. In particular,
knowledge that there is a prior obligation not to rob overrides any inference
that we should rob. This clearly has some appeal if we accept distributive
inferences with obligations, and consider the main problem with the Good
Samaritan to reside in the conflict between such inferences and other pre-
9existing obligations. In some respects this may be considered a variant of
the approach of Åqvist (1967), but formulated with more general-purpose
machinery. Defeasible inference is a very powerful and general technique,
and we may wonder whether there are any principles that govern when it is
applicable. As with Åqvist’s proposal it is also not clear how to determine
the relative priority of different obligations.
One question we might ask ourselves is whether it is right to take a spe-
cific examples—such as the (conjunctive) Good Samaritan—and use it to
motivate radical revisions to a formal theory. More specifically, we may
wonder whether such specific examples provide enough evidence to support
particular views on logic and language, including the behaviour of logical
conjunction and implication, and the appropriate way of modelling natural
language conjunction, modifier expressions and relative clauses. We might
want to consider whether any conclusions drawn from the Good Samaritan
carry over to less emotive examples.
To put this another way, is the Good Samaritan a “representative” example
of an obligation involving intersective adjectives, and/or relative clauses? If
we have an appropriate analysis of the Good Samaritan, do we have an ap-
propriate analysis for all examples of the same form, (with or without poten-
tially conflicting obligations)? Or is it actually the case that the problematic
issues raised by the Good Samaritan example are a particular instance of a
more general pattern of behaviour, that also arises in non-deontic contexts?
3 The Hygienic Cook
To explore this issue further, let us reflect on our intuitions when we substi-
tute “use” for “help”; “clean” for “robbed”; “knife” for “man” in the sen-
tences
“You should help a man who has been robbed.”
“You should help a robbed man.”
This gives the following.
“You should use a knife that has been cleaned.”
“You should use a clean knife.”
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These may be glossed as
“Find a knife that has been cleaned, and use it.”
“If you wish/need/are obliged to use a knife, [you are under an obli-
gation to] ensure that it has been cleaned.”
Or perhaps, in some contexts, the stronger
“You are obliged to clean and [also] use a knife.”
Some respondents say that the sentence appears to express a conditional obli-
gation:
“You are permitted to use a knife only if it is clean.”
“You are permitted to use a knife provided that it is clean.”
Despite having the same form as the Good Samaritan example, the Clean
Knife sentence almost certainly does not entail
“If a knife has been cleaned, you are under an obligation to use it.”
And, as we have seen, the Good Samaritan example almost certainly does
not entail
“If you wish/need/are obliged to help someone who has been robbed,
there is an obligation to rob that person.”
There is thus a disparity in the acceptable entailments.
We can consider how some of the proposed solutions to the Good Samar-
itan apply in this case. One difficulty is determining which reading of the
Clean Knife example is actually the most appropriate in a neutral context.
But we can still reflect on whether the proposals for the Good Samaritan say
something that is relevant for the interpretation of the Clean Knife example.
It can be argued that the proposals concerning multi-level obligations
(Åqvist, 1967) and agency (Nowell-Smith & Lemmon, 1960) do not really
help us to understand what counts as an appropriate reading for the Clean
Knife example.
An analysis expressed in terms of conditionality and relative clauses (van
Fraassen, 1972) may be of some relevance, but would still require further
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work to account for the radically different readings that are available. The
same argument applies to an approach that distinguishes practives from in-
dicatives (Castañeda, 1981).
In the case of defeasibility (Bonevac, 1998; Makinson & van der Torre,
2003), the argument could be made that there are a range of different in-
ferences that are available, but different inferences take priority in different
settings. We may question whether this is a principled account, or an ad hoc
fix. If mutually inconsistent inference patterns need to be supported, how
are we to determine which takes priority in any given scenario?
Again, denying that obligations distribute (Jackson, 1985; Jones & Pörn,
1985) is a catch-all solution which avoids any inference that there is an obli-
gation to use a knife, or to clean it, but which appears somewhat unsatis-
factory for the reasons given before: we have no means of deciding what
exactly we are supposed to do when presented with a complex obligation.
One might seek to deflect the problem of accounting for the various pat-
terns of acceptable inference by arguing that the differences in the inter-
pretation are pragmatic rather than semantic. On such a view, semantics is
that aspect of meaning that is based systematically on syntactic form, and
pragmatics then explains contingent differences based upon lexical mean-
ing, presuppositions, and focus and so on. But perhaps we can do better:
perhaps we can go someway towards accounting for any such “pragmatic”
differences in these examples.
Perhaps the disparity in the intuitive interpretations of these examples is
not a problem of deontic representation and reasoning as such, but is some-
thing which is best conceived of as a specific example of a some other
more general problem, or pattern of behaviour. Some candidates worth
considering here include insights from pseudo-imperatives (Franke, 2005);
topic/focus effects (Rooth, 1993), and the analysis of relative clauses and
other modifier expressions (Arnold, 2007; Wyner, 2008).
It is instructive to seek out other cases where changing the words radically
alters the nature of the supposed obligation. Consider conjunctive pseudo-
imperatives (Franke, 2005)
“Take another drink and you will die.”
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“Take another drink and you will be happy.”
For most readers, the first sentence will suggest you should not take another
drink, whereas the second suggests that you should. Thus a small change in
the described outcome radically alters the import of the sentence.
The difference lies in what is seen as a desirable outcome: dying ver-
sus being happy. Alternatively, it could be due to the relative costs/benefits
of taking a drink versus dying/being happy. We may wonder whether this
provides a potential solution, given that for most people, robbing is less de-
sirable than cleaning.6
Another place to look is in the analysis of topic and focus. Consider the
following example.
“A big female is usually the leader of a group” (Rooth, 1993)
This could mean
“When a female is big, she is usually the leader of a group.”
or
“When something is a group, the leader of it is usually a big female.”
The distinctions in the interpretation could be determined by reflecting on
the question to which the sentence might provide an answer, for example,
“What does a big female usually do?” as opposed to “Who is the leader of a
group?”
The same approach may be relevant in determining an appropriate analysis
of deontic statements; they might be considered to be providing answers to
implicit questions of the form
“What should you do if you encounter someone who has been robbed?”
and
“What kind of knife should be used?”.
6In the case of these pseudo-imperative examples, it is worth noting that a substitut-
ing “or” for “and” also gives rise to a radical changes in meaning, as noted by Franke
(2005) and others. The first sentence would take on the appearance of a threat “Take an-
other drink or you will die”. The second sentence appears to become infelicitous “Take
another drink or you will be happy”.
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We might consider whether there are differences in the telicity and the focus
(for example, on “help” and “clean”, respectively) that could explain the
acceptable interpretations.
Wyner (2008) argues that the Good Samaritan paradox can be explained
in terms of non-restrictive relative clauses (so we have “. . . a man, who has
been robbed . . . ”). Such clauses can be taken to lie outside the scope of a
given context (Arnold, 2007), which can include the deontic operator. But
we may question whether this is actually the correct interpretation of the
Good Samaritan: it presupposes that we know who needs help independently
of any robbery facts. Even so, the idea of finding principled, independently
motivated grounds for taking some material outside the scope of the deontic
operator is appealing.
4 Summary of the Issues
The Good Samaritan example was originally used to illustrate a potential
difficulty that needs to be considered in the formal analysis of deontic state-
ments. It could be argued that focusing on that particular example may result
in theories that “over-fit” the data, and that it is inappropriate to assume that
the Good Samaritan is representative of obligations involving modifier ex-
pressions. For any problematic example, other factors may be at work which
need to be considered, and which are the remit of some other aspect of inter-
pretation.
Another general issue concerns the proper boundary between semantic
and pragmatic analysis. There is a risk that attributing something to prag-
matics is little more than a rhetorical device for ignoring those things that
cannot (yet) be accounted for within a semantic framework. It would be bet-
ter to have principled reasons for deciding when something is outside the
scope of a semantic theory. It may also be appropriate to consider the “in-
terfaces” between semantics and pragmatics, in particular how a pragmatic
analysis may influence semantic interpretation and inference.
Similar issues arise more generally in determining the scope of the anal-
ysis of a given phenomena, and the demarcation between various aspects of
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interpretation. How much should a theory of deontic expressions say about a
given example, and how much can be relegated to other aspects of interpre-
tation, such as generics, focus, and so on? When is it acceptable to decline
to take responsibility for the behaviour of a given example?
5 Conclusions
If we only consider a limited selection of examples, it may appear that “prag-
matic” effects make it intrinsically difficult to formalise a logical account of
obligations and permissions. But there may actually be principled accounts
of these effects, where problematic aspects of the behaviour of “deontic” ex-
amples are in reality specific examples of essentially non-deontic phenom-
ena. To go beyond toy examples, it is important to try to identify principled
accounts of other phenomena that may provide an alternative explanation
for the behaviour of the examples. This may clarify our intuitions about
the meaning of obligations and permissions as such, and simplify the for-
malisation of their essential character. These arguments may generalise to
other aspects of formal semantics and philosophical logic: when using nat-
ural language examples to motivate an analysis, we must take the linguistics
seriously.
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